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Presidents, Politics, and Power
ABSTRACT
President Xi Jinping dominated the Chinese stage during 2018, continuing to con-
solidate his power as the CCP sought to reassert its primacy. China flexed its muscles
as a great power in a pitch for global leadership. Xi pushed constantly to portray
China as the promoter of an open global economy, even as his own continued to
slow incrementally amid the widening trade war with the US.
KEYWORDS: China, great power, Xi Jinping, corruption, trade war, North Korea
IT MIGHT SEEM A BIT ODD to start an analysis of China in 2018 by referring
back to how China was being viewed in the pages of this journal before
President Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2013. However, making this
short journey is illuminating and sets the context for the study of China’s
(domestic) politics today. Then, Hu Jintao andWen Jiabao seemed to see the
solution to the various problems facing the leadership—including questions
about the legitimacy of one-party rule itself—in opening up the political
sphere. Hu seemed to want to create a listening, responsive, transparent,
predictable, and legally bound party. As recently as 2012, Yongnian Zheng
correctly pointed to the “unusually active” promotion of different ideas by
various groups, including proponents of new forms of democratic socialism.1
How things have changed.
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SAME OLD CHINA, SAME OLD PROBLEMS
Well, some things have changed, at least. In some respects, much that was
done and said in 2018 gave a sense of de´ja` vu, and many of the problems Hu
and Wen were struggling to resolve remain very much alive today. For
example, the formal adoption by the National People’s Congress of the
previously announced National Supervisory Commission, with greater
powers to investigate a broader range of personnel than the previous Ministry
of Supervision, suggests that the long-standing challenge of dealing with
corruption remains unﬁnished, even if the anticorruption campaign has also
morphed into a means of ensuring wider compliance and control.2 Premier Li
Keqiang’s “Report on the Work of the Government,” delivered to the
National People’s Congress in March, also highlighted a number of conti-
nuities. To be sure, this was primarily an exercise in lauding the achievements
of the past ﬁve years, and emphasizing the importance of the leadership of Xi
Jinping in those successes. Supported by the release of Amazing China,
a documentary lauding the party’s achievements and hard work on behalf
of the Chinese people over the previous ﬁve years, the overall message was
one of success and the transition to a new era of greatness.
Nevertheless, the report also highlighted a number of challenges that have
been on successive premiers’ lists for years: residual poverty, environmental
degradation, and the need to create new innovation-based drivers of growth.3
Dealing with vulnerabilities in the ﬁnancial system also remains an ongoing
and key concern, with 2018 seeing (at various times) a focus on state-owned
enterprise debt, local government debt (and the way that provincial bonds
were being used), the collapse of investment schemes, the need for better
regulation of the shadow banking sector, the risk of asset bubbles bursting,
and the very much related issue of the record increase in household debt (for
which the eye-watering, almost incredible cost of housing relative to wages
bears at least some responsibility). And it is not just the debt itself that is seen
2. For details on the scope of its mandate, see Deng Jinting, “The National Supervision
Commission: A New Anti-corruption Model in China,” International Journal of Law, Crime and
Justice 52 (March 2018): 58–73.
3. Li also presented a picture of an ongoing process of opening markets, reducing regulation,
and allowing the private sector and the market to ﬂourish—though this is not a story of reform over
the previous ﬁve years that every external observer would recognize. For the full report, see Li
Keqiang, “Report on the Work of the Government: Delivered at the First Session of the 13th
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 5, 2018,” <http://online.wsj
.com/public/resources/documents/NPC2018_GovtWorkReport_English.pdf>.
22  ASIAN SURVEY 59:1
as a problem; many of the solutions to cutting debt now and reducing the
dependence on debt-driven growth in the future would slow growth and
could have destabilizing consequences. So, like their predecessors, Xi and his
team have to balance the longer-term desire to bring about a pretty substan-
tial shift and create what they see as a more sustainable economic structure,
with more short-term considerations of what might lead to social problems
and instability (and calculations of how capable they are of dealing with
them). And as we shall see, changes in the international environment have
not made this balancing any easier. The result, according to the China
Dashboard, is “second thoughts about the balance between reform and
avoiding pain,” with the “meaningful reform” that was promised in the ﬁrst
year of Xi’s rule still failing to materialize in most economic areas.4
The year 2018 also saw another example of the sort of health scare that has
been blamed for undermining popular conﬁdence in governance and regula-
tory structures in the past, this time to do with faulty vaccines. And although
there might have been increasing international interest throughout the year in
what ofﬁcial Chinese discourses argue are not internment camps but rather
“free vocational training through vocational education institutions” in
Xinjiang,5 analyses in previous years’ pages of this journal show that this is
far from a new issue or agenda.
NEW POLITICS IN A NEW ERA
But Chinese politics has clearly moved a long way since 2012, with 2018
arguably displaying ﬁve key differences from previous eras. First, as already
noted, there has been a shift in emphasis in the message that high-proﬁle
events are meant to transmit to the people. The idea remains of supporting
the party to get through the challenges it still faces. But there is now
considerably more emphasis on supporting the party because of what it has
already achieved—or perhaps more correctly, this speciﬁc manifestation of
the party, under Xi. Second, Xi’s concern about the role, sustainability, and
4. China Dashboard, “Quarterly Net Assessment: Summer 2018,” <https://aspi.gistapp.com/
summer-2018/page/overview>.
5. Interview with Shohrat Zakir, chair of the government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region, Xinhuanet, October 16, 2018, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/16/c_137535821
.htm>. The Guardian carried a number of reports on Xinjiang throughout 2018, which are collected
at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/xinjiang>.
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even purpose of single-party rule seem to go further than the previous and
residual (and admittedly still crucial) focus on corruption. There were also
fundamental problems relating to a lack of common purpose, unity, soli-
darity, cohesion, and leadership. Third, in addition to this potential crisis of
the party, Xi also seemed to identify a crisis of and in society itself—a society
that was losing (or had even lost) its moral and ethical core and lacked
a sense of direction, cohesiveness, purpose, and leadership. As Xi put it in
his speech to the 19th Party Congress, the party needs to “inspire the people
to embrace shared ideals, convictions, values, and moral standards.”6 And of
course the former (problems in the party) is seen as a key cause of the latter
(problems in society).
Fourth, as Murray Scot Tanner argued in his review of 2015, Xi’s under-
standing of the best way to ﬁnd solutions to these and other problems has
fundamentally changed.7 Rather than opening up the political process and
political debate, Xi has tried to close and control it. Fifth and ﬁnally, although
the shift to a more activist Chinese foreign policy preceded Xi’s assumption of
power, there has been a clear and signiﬁcant new shift in tone and emphasis.
Xi is now very happy to assert his country’s great-power status, to annunciate
and promote its global goals, and to make a pitch for global leadership in
some areas, at a time when other more established Great Powers seem to be
retreating from some of their previous leadership roles. All ﬁve of these
changes had profound impacts on the trajectory of China’s domestic politics
and international interactions in 2018.
In terms of the domestic agenda, the emphasis remains on reasserting
control—the party’s control over society, and Xi’s personal control over both
the party and the country as a whole. In this respect it would have been hard
for 2018 to match the signiﬁcance of the previous year, which culminated
(politically if not temporally) in the reformulation of the party’s own consti-
tution at the 19th Party Congress to include “Xi Jinping Thought on Social-
ism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Indeed, the signiﬁcance of
2017 continued to reverberate, with studying the 19th Party Congress
6. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All
Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,”
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_
Congress.pdf>.
7. Murray Scot Tanner, “China in 2015: China’s Dream, Xi’s Party,” Asian Survey 56:1 (2016):
19–33.
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becoming a major pastime in 2018. It will take time for the other major
changes at the congress to crystallize into actual change; changing the primary
contradiction, which is meant to be the starting point of all party work, is
a good case in point. The last time it was changed (from ﬁghting class struggle
to ﬁghting underdevelopment, under Deng Xiaoping), it paved the way for
a radical shift in priorities and policies that until then would have been all but
unthinkable. Unless changing it again is simply a way to show that Xi has the
power to do it, we might suspect that the new focus on ﬁghting “unbalanced
and inadequate development” to help fulﬁll the people’s “ever-growing needs
for a better life” will be used to force some groups and people to do things
that they are not currently inclined to do, or to stop doing things that
currently beneﬁt them.
And yet the (people’s) congress of March 2018 was arguably as signiﬁcant
as the (party) congress of 2017. Most headlines focused on the decision to
abolish the two-term limit for the Chinese presidency, a limit that was
previously formally restricted by the state constitution, rather than the infor-
mal “norm” of two terms that applies to the party leader (or, as we might ﬁnd
in 2022, applied, in the past tense). Some observers expressed surprise that Xi
had chosen to change a legally binding limit to stay in a position that had
traditionally been a largely titular head-of-state role in China, with the pre-
mier holding the real authority in the state system, and the individual who
held the presidency holding real power through concurrently being the
party’s general secretary. But in Xi’s China, it makes sense. This is not
a “division of labor” leadership as in the Hu-Wen era, or even the way Zhu
Rongji was responsible for economic management while Jiang Zemin led the
party. This is not the Xi–Li era but the Xi era, and just because the presidency
did not result in primacy over the premier in the past doesn’t mean that it can
never do. Moreover, by diplomatic convention, it is the head of state, not the
party leader, who gets to go to major international events and to visit and
host other heads of state. It is “President Xi” who is the global statesman on
the global stage, a role that he seems rather comfortable with and indeed keen
to expand.
But while many writers focused on the prospect of Xi’s lifetime leadership
of China, a range of other changes were announced or formalized that are
likely to have fundamental long-term consequences. In terms of personnel,
the long-time governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan,
retired, and Wang Qishan was appointed vice president and expected to
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focus on the not insigniﬁcant task of managing China–US relations, a task
that became even more signiﬁcant and difﬁcult as the year progressed.
Notably, Wang had not been reappointed to the Politburo the previous
November, which would have broken norms over age restrictions, though
he is thought to be still attending Politburo meetings without the power to
vote, thus somewhat blurring the distinction between respecting conventions
and breaking them. Liu He was named vice premier and placed in charge of
the new(ish) Financial Stability and Development Committee (established
the previous year), giving him signiﬁcant personal power over macroeco-
nomic policy.
When it comes to institutional arrangements, the changes announced or
formalized at the National People’s Congress were in many ways more
signiﬁcant for the long run than the question of who is running what. We
have already noted that the new Supervisory Commission came on stream
with signiﬁcant new powers. But this was just one small part of a major and
comprehensive reorganization of ministries, commissions, and regulatory
authorities and responsibilities that has effectively redrawn the map of how
central governance and administration works in China. The extent of the
changes makes them impossible to outline in detail here. What we can say is
that the overall agenda seems to be to reduce overlapping jurisdictions in
some areas, and to streamline the government policymaking process by
combining a large number of different agencies into a smaller number of
new ones, which should reduce the potential for conﬂicting goals to stymie
reform objectives. For example, the new Ministry of National Resources now
has authority for work that was previously split between eight different
institutions, and the Ministry of Emergency Management takes up the work
of 13 different actors.8 The residual state planning agency, the National
Development and Reform Commission, seems to have been somewhat
diminished in status, with some of its areas of authority transferred to the
new ministries. There also appears to be an absorption of some state roles by
party organizations, or agencies that blur the relationship between the two. It
is wrong to say that the party-state is back, because it never fully went away,
but party agencies, committees, and secretaries seem to have more power and
8. Some of the old agencies remain as subordinate entities in the new ministries. A compre-
hensive chart showing how the old have been transformed into the new can be found at <https://
yiqinfu.github.io/posts/state-council-reform/>.
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to be taken more seriously as powerful actors today than was always the case
in the past.
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
However, in terms of economic change, the movement was not all one way
(toward greater state control). The year also saw changes in foreign invest-
ment regulations to allow greater foreign participation and/or ownership in
a number of sectors (mining; agriculture; automobiles, shipping and aviation;
ﬁnance and insurance; and infrastructure). Moreover, not only do local
governments remain major determinants of what happens in China, but the
importance of their ability to do what works locally in light of local condi-
tions has been reafﬁrmed, even as central reforms have been taking place.
Does this all add up to a contradictory strategy? Not if you put aside
dichotomous understandings of state versus market and the idea that eco-
nomic reform takes place on a linear trajectory from one to the other. If the
idea is to achieve a set of objectives, then some of these might be best attained
by the market and/or foreign investors, while others are best done in the state
(or state-related) sector. The central state remains the main deﬁner and
regulator of these goals, but there is considerable autonomy at the local level
to decide how best to attain local objectives, which should aggregate into
national goals. The problem for central policymakers is that these local actors
don’t always have objectives or methods that do indeed add up to a coherent
overall national position. Neither do nonstate actors or the market always do
the job they are meant or expected to do. When necessary, the state can and
does step in to restrict what can and can’t be done—as it did, for example,
when Chinese investors didn’t all invest where the state wanted them to in
2016. So nonstate market actors are free to pursue their own individual and
commercial objectives, but only as long as these contribute to the attainment
of overall national goals. If and when they don’t, the market is deemed to
have failed—not market failure as understood in Western capitalist econo-
mies, but within the logic of the Chinese national project.
POLITICS AND SOCIETY
Below the elite/administrative level, perhaps the best example of how the
control agenda is playing out is in the new regulations for microblog service
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providers, which mandate them to “play an active role in promoting
economic development and serving the public, promote socialist core values,
disseminate advanced culture, [and] adhere to correct public opinion
orientation.”9 More generally, the state continues to develop new ways of
collecting and using data to support its objectives—a project so wide-ranging
that we will soon need a new concept to replace “big data” in the Chinese
case—“supermassive data,” perhaps. As Lotus Ruan puts it, “If data is the
new oil, China is oil super-rich. Data is the essential ingredient for artiﬁcial
intelligence . . . and is underpinning a wide-ranging revolution.”10 But along-
side these new techniques, more tried and trusted mechanisms are also very
much in play, with Wang Huning charged with promoting and constructing
a new “spiritual civilization” to provide a new moral core for Chinese society,
one that draws on both China’s revolutionary spirit and its traditional culture
to provide a new set of socialist values that will unite the population behind
common goals, aspirations, and dreams.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese media also devote enormous space and time
to not just reporting Xi’s major speeches and interventions, but typically also
reproducing them in full. And there were a lot of them in 2018: at the
National People’s Congress in March, at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia on
Hainan Island in April, at the Qingdao Summit of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization in June, at the BRICS Business Forum and Summit in
South Africa in July, at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) in September, at the Shanghai International Import
Expo in November, and on the 40th anniversary of the start of economic
reform in December. Despite the combined length of all these, and at the
risk of oversimpliﬁcation, we can perhaps distill the overall message in them
down to four keywords: conﬁdence, difference, leadership, and destiny.
Conﬁdence in the economic and political structures or models that have
delivered Chinese successes. Difference both in terms of the difference
between these successful Chinese models and discredited and failing West-
ern ones, and also in terms of how China will act compared to previous great
9. Cyberspace Administration of China and Ofﬁce of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Com-
mission, “Provisions on the Administration of Microblog Information Services,” February 2, 2018,
<http://www.cac.gov.cn/2018-02/02/c_1122358726.htm>.
10. Lotus Ruan, “Big Data in China and the Battle for Privacy,” Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Barton, Australian Capital Territory, 2018, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/big-data-
china-and-battle-privacy>.
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powers. Leadership in the form of the pivotal role of the party (and Xi’s
leadership of it) in delivering Chinese successes. And destiny, for China to
return to its rightful place at the center stage of global politics and to provide
new forms of leadership for the world—though here we might instead use
the oxymoronic concept of a “contingent destiny,” as it is inevitable only if
party leadership is maintained.
CHINA AND THE WORLD
That said, this message is not just intended for an internal audience, and
when Xi Jinping talks at key international events, or international leaders are
invited to Beijing to attend conferences and summits, there is obviously an
outward-facing agenda and target audience. For example, the FOCAC sum-
mit in Beijing was a key means of interacting with African leaders, and
promoting to them (and to those in the rest of the world that were watching)
Chinese plans for future collaborations, and a platform for announcing new
aid and investment projects. Xi also used every opportunity to push the idea
of China as the defender of multilateralism and the promoter of an open
global economy, at a time when the US was turning inward and promoting
protectionism. When you add on Xi’s afﬁrmation of China’s readiness to take
a leadership role in reforming global governance at the party’s own Foreign
Affairs Work Conference in June, then, as Elizabeth Economy argues, Xi
Jinping in 2018 effectively “proclaimed that China has both the intent and the
capability to reshape the international order.”11
This new(ish) proactive global leadership agenda has seen the continued
active promotion of the idea of a “community with shared destiny for man-
kind” (renlei mingyun gongtongti) as an alternative to what is typically
described as the Cold War–style, confrontational international order favored
and promoted by Western Great Powers (and particularly the US). This
concept is very much associated with the personal thinking and preferences
of Xi Jinping. So too is the Belt and Road Initiative. This transcontinental
project continued to be promoted both at home and overseas, though with
signs of a more moderate tone toward the end of the year. Such tempering
may well be related to a string of stories in 2018 pointing to pushback from
11. Elizabeth Economy, “Xi Jinping’s Superpower Plans: As the U.S. Retreats, Beijing Is Talking
More Boldly about How It Wants to Change the International Order and Assert Its Own Values and
Interests,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2018, C3.
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a number of actual and potential recipients of Chinese investment, either
from concern over the economic terms of projects and the prospect of
becoming dependent on debt to China, or from fear of growing Chinese
political inﬂuence (or both). The concerted effort, at the FOCAC summit, to
discount the idea that China is a neocolonial power also suggests the impor-
tance the Chinese leadership places on maintaining a positive international
reputation—perhaps amid rumbles of discontent from its neighbors.
Concerns about growing Chinese political inﬂuence also seemed to climb
to a new level in 2018 in Australia, New Zealand, the US, and Europe. In the
US Congress, a bill designed to require China’s US-based Confucius Insti-
tutes to register as foreign agents was introduced on June 4. Confucius
Institutes are partnerships between a Chinese and a foreign institution (typ-
ically, but not always, universities) designed to promote and expand the
teaching of Chinese language and culture overseas. They are also part of
a larger Chinese project to insert Chinese voices into debates over the con-
sequences of China’s rise in other countries, and to tell positive stories about
China. While there has long been some anxiety over the rules and regulations
that guide them—for example, over who can and cannot be employed in
them—concern has grown that Confucius Institutes are trying to more
broadly inﬂuence what can and can’t be said about China in the universities
that host them, either through outright controls and bans, or through the
intangible inculcation of a culture of self-censorship among those who
research or teach China-related issues. Add these together and they suggest
that life as a great power with articulated leadership and reform ambitions is
likely to result in ever-growing scrutiny of how these ambitions are being
pursued, with consequences not always in China’s favor.
China’s leadership credentials and skills were tested in more tangible ways
over security concerns on the Korean Peninsula. Throughout 2017, there had
been considerable pressure on China to use its power over North Korea to
make it stop testing nuclear and ballistic weapons. A standard Chinese
response was ﬁrst that this was primarily a Korea–US issue, and second, that
sanctions did not work. Kim Jong-un’s apparent lack of desire for strong
links with the leadership in Beijing was also often cited as a third reason for
China’s relative lack of inﬂuence. The meeting between Kim and President
Trump in Singapore in June 2018 seemed to suggest that the ﬁrst of these
arguments was indeed true, and that this was an issue to be resolved by
Washington–Pyongyang diplomacy. Yet the Singapore summit took place
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after Kim had made his ﬁrst trip to Beijing as North Korean leader to meet
with Xi in March, quickly followed by a second meeting in Dalian in May.
Kim returned to China a week after the June summit with Trump, for his
third meeting with Xi in four months. Reports suggested that China had
signiﬁcantly cut its exports to North Korea prior to the ﬁrst of these meet-
ings, perhaps exceeding the reductions stipulated in ofﬁcial UN sanctions.12
Clearly, US policy will be a major determinant of what happens to the Koreas
in the future. But there can be little doubt that China will also have a signif-
icant role to play—and indeed has played a substantial role already, irrespec-
tive of what ultimately happens.
If Trump loomed large in the Sino–Korean–US triangular relationship, he
loomed even larger in the bilateral one, and despite his previously professed
friendship with Xi, 2018 might eventually be remembered as the year that
a new era of US–China competition started. There had been long-standing
concern in a number of Western countries about the lack of reciprocity in
trade and investment relations with China. The expansion of Chinese
merger-and-acquisition activity in Western economies (particularly the very
rapid growth of 2016), combined with the Made in China 2025 strategy
designed to upgrade China’s technological and economic base, had only
served to increase concern that China might be gaining control of strategic
economic resources and sectors in other countries. There were further con-
cerns that China was repatriating foreign technology and expertise (and
brand names) back to China while continuing to restrict access to its own
market. Despite Xi’s repeated commitment to an open global trading system,
some liberalization in some Chinese sectors during 2018, and the massive
Import Expo showcase in Shanghai in November, the preferred Chinese
narrative of Chinese openness is not ﬁnding as much purchase outside China
as its architects would like.
While this concern was voiced in a number of European capitals in 2018,
the idea of losing out to China on an uneven playing ﬁeld has been articulated
more loudly and for a longer period in the US. It was part of Trump’s touted
justiﬁcation for an America First economic strategy during his presidential
campaign. And to the surprise of many—including some in China—this
12. James Kynge, “China Uses Economic Muscle to Bring N Korea to Negotiating Table,”
Financial Times, March 30, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/8a2b2696-33f7-11e8-ae84-
494103e73f7f>.
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rhetoric became policy with the imposition of two rounds of tariffs on a range
of Chinese imports in July and September.13 The tariffs generated a reciprocal
Chinese response, complaints to the WTO, and the search for alliances that
might offset the impact or prompt a rethink in the US.
Within China, the need to counteract the economic impact further com-
plicated the problem of ﬁnding a balance between maintaining growth and
shifting the basis of the economic model. The trade war also seemed to
puncture some of the conﬁdence about the robustness of China’s successes.
This led to something of a step back from what was getting close to becoming
a triumphalist political atmosphere, with a number of China’s very promi-
nent online debaters openly criticizing those who had asserted, on micro-
blogging sites and other online discussion forums, that China would soon
surpass the US (or already had) as the number-one global power.
Moreover, the way that Trump used an address to the UN General
Assembly in September to accuse China of meddling in US politics suggested
that this new emphasis on competition was about more than just economics.
And if Vice President Mike Pence’s speech to the Hudson Institute in
October, which was heavily critical of China’s domestic political repression,
military modernization, and economic strategy and goals, wasn’t the
announcement of a new policy of competition and confrontation, it certainly
gave that impression.14 So too did the arrest of a senior Chinese business
executive in Canada in December (Meng Wanzhou, of the Huawei telecom-
munications company) on charges laid in the US that she had breached
sanctions on Iraq, and what looked very much like the subsequent retaliatory
detention of three Canadian citizens in China, one of whom was facing
a death sentence at the time of this writing.
GOING FORWARD
December 2018 marked 40 years since the start of the reform-and-opening
policy that transformed China from its Maoist past into what it has
13. In addition to economic rationales, the tariffs were a response to Chinese purchases of
Russian jets and equipment that were subject to US sanctions. The South China Morning Post has
a special online collection of its articles on the “US-China trade war” at <https://www.scmp.com/
topics/us-china-trade-war>.
14. “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China,” October
4, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-
administrations-policy-toward-china/>.
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become today. But you don’t need to go back to 1978 to see how much
China has changed. In terms of China’s global economic position and
power, 2008 will do. In terms of domestic polity and politics, you don’t
have to go back even that far. The immediate direction of economic
change in China remains unclear; it has been made even more opaque
as the leadership tries to deal with the consequences of the trade war.
A major puzzle remains: how to lower debt, manage ﬁnancial risk, deﬂate
potential bubbles, and reduce overcapacity without reducing growth to
levels that begin to generate discontent—and without damaging the per-
sonal fortunes of tens of millions of Chinese homeowners and investors.
In this respect at least, the challenges facing the leadership in 2019 are not
dissimilar to those that have been facing successive Chinese leaders for the
past four decades.
But what has changed, and changed considerably, is China’s place in the
world. China is now a major global power, if not yet the major global power,
with clearly announced ambitions to lead reform of global governance and
increase what it calls its “discursive power”—its ability to shape the under-
standings, deﬁnitions, and norms that are the starting point for many inter-
national interactions. These ambitions have not been universally welcomed.
One thing four decades of historical perspective provides is the knowledge
that what appears at the time to be a sea change can ultimately turn out to be
just a blip. Given the vagaries of the current era of US politics, the Sino–US
competition of 2018 could conceivably turn out to be a blip as attentions turn
elsewhere. But the signs are that we could well be in for a prolonged period of
intensifying competition across a range of different issue areas. Even if it does
turn out to be a blip, one of the lessons of 2018 is that life as a great power
brings its own complications and challenges, which are unlikely to become
any easier to resolve in 2019.
* * *
UPDATE
Although many countries would be more than happy to record a growth
rate of 6.5% (and it is the target for the year as a whole), when China hit that
ﬁgure in the third quarter of 2018, it was the lowest quarterly rate since
China and the world were recovering from the global ﬁnancial crisis in
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2009.15 It also represented a small but steady drop over the course of the
year from 6.8% and 6.7% in the ﬁrst and second quarter, respectively.
The reliability of Chinese statistics has been questioned for many years,
and the real ﬁgure could be much lower. But even if we stick with the
ofﬁcial ﬁgures, growth is clearly slowing, which is not surprising given
the attempt to reduce the level of debt in the economy, and to reduce the
reliance on investment as a driver of growth, and the onset of the trade war
with the US, with both the producer and the consumer price indices
turning negative in November. While investment in ﬁxed assets was 5.9%
up on the previous year (for the ﬁrst 11 months), this marks a slowdown in
the rate of growth, from 7.2% at the same stage in 2017.
The trade war had a big impact on the structure of Chinese trade. In the
ﬁrst half of the year, exports grew by 12.8% and imports by 19.9%, resulting in
a decrease in the overall trade surplus. But in the ﬁnal quarter, the asymmetry
in growth rates ﬂipped, and the surplus began to grow again. Most notably,
exports to the US continued to grow despite the announcement of the tariffs,
resulting in new record monthly trade surpluses—US$ 35.6 billion by
November—and a 16.8% increase in the overall surplus in the ﬁrst 11 months
of 2018 (over the same period in 2017). It’s possible that this was a result of
exporters trying to get their goods to the US before tariffs began to hit in the
new year (or new ones were announced)—assuming that the 90-day truce to
try and negotiate a deal announced when Trump met Xi at the G20 meeting
in Buenos Aires does not result in a resolution before then. Inward invest-
ment also increased, by 6.5% in the ﬁrst 10months, to over US$ 107 billion in
October. However, the general trend in the economy as a whole, of greater
issues as the year progressed, was repeated here as well, with the monthly
growth rate slowing, before registering a rather dramatic 27% year-on-year
reduction in November. Outward investment also increased, up 5% in total
by September, and by 12% in Belt and Road countries. One result of these
overseas projects is that China now has 996,000 workers employed in other
countries. The policy of controlling types of overseas investments continued
in 2018, with the Ministry of Commerce reporting no new investment pro-
jects at all in sports, entertainment, and real estate.
15. The statistics in this section are all taken from ofﬁcial Chinese sources at the National Bureau
of Statistics and the Ministry of Commerce, available at <http://www.stats.gov.cn>and <http://
mofcom.gov.cn/statistic>.
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